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I. INTRODUCTION
"The defendant as victim" is an interesting but definitely oxymoronic phrase
void of real value to our legal system. For the accused could never be a victim:
he is the victimizer.
This phrase, however contradictory, may not be as inappropriate as it seems.
In fact, it may be wholly relevant in situations in which a child is the
prosecution's chief, and often sole, witness. In such instances judges may be
confronted with two compelling decisions which will determine whether the
defendant will become a victim. The first decision is on a motion to disqualify
1The author gratefully acknowledges the assistance of Professor Stephan
Landsman, Cleveland-Marshall College of Law, Cleveland State University.
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the child as a witness, 2 motivated by the fear that the child will not testify
accurately.3 In general, the request for such an order is denied, since courts are
sympathetic to the plight of the prosecution.4 If the court disqualified the child,
the case would be unlikely to proceed.5
The second decision may involve ruling on a motion for new trial when the
defendant presents the child's recantation as newly discovered evidence. The
emergence of recantation testimony should raise important questions in the
mind of the trial judge. Was the court's original competency determination
correct? Was the child coerced into testifying?6 Did the child testify truthfully
at trial?7 Was the testimony a product of the child's remembered experiences
or was it learned as a result of the pre-trial interview process? 8 All are important
considerations when weighing the validity of a new trial motion. However, all
of these questions might not be asked and, if they are asked, might not be
addressed with the necessary objectivity or from the necessary perspectives.
Failure to make the necessary inquiries,9 coupled with exceedingly high
standards for granting new trial motions10 could result in a grave injustice to
an innocent defendant. This note will explore the standards for granting new
trials within the child recantation setting. It will argue that insistence on
respecting the evidentiary statements of children is contrary to common sense
and current research. As a result, the standards for new trial ought to be
rethought. Part II will analyze the two prevalent standards used by courts to
weigh the merit of a new trial motion and will show why both standards
present a nearly insurmountable hurdle for a movant to satisfy. Part III will
explore the special issues that confront a court each time a young "victim"
testifies. It will demonstrate why reviewing courts need to be less deferential
to the trial court's factual determinations when child recantation evidence is
presented. Part IV will analyze the judicial inference which courts are
"permitted" to make when dealing with recantation evidence. Finally, Part V
2The most common objection to the testimony is that the child lacks the requisite
competency to be a witness. See, e.g., State v. Carrillo, 502 P.2d 1343 (Ariz. 1972).
3State v. Smith, 401 P.2d 445, 447 (Utah 1965).
4 Cf. id. (recognizing that great difficulty surrounds the prosecution of abuse related
offenses).
S Very often the prosecution's entire case rests upon the child's ability to testify. John
E.B. Myers, The Legal Response to Child Abuse: In the Best Interest of Children?, 24J. OFFAM.
L. 149,185 (1985).
6 See, e.g., State v. Clark, 682 P.2d 1339 (Mont. 1984).
7 Brook Hart & Anthony Bartholomew, Forward to HOLLIDA WAKEFIELD & RALPH
UNDERWAGER, ACCUSATIONS OF CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE at xi (1988).
8 Id.
9 See infra part III.A.1.
10See infra part l.A-C.
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will propose an alternative to current practices that seeks to strike a more even
balance between the competing interests of the defendant and society.
II. STANDARDS FOR GRANTING NEW TRIAL BASED UPON NEWLY DISCOVERED
EVIDENCE 1
In determining whether a defendant should be granted a new trial on the
grounds of newly discovered evidence, 12 courts have applied one of two
standards. The first, commonly known as the Berry or "probability" standard,
has been accepted by state and federal courts for many years. 13 In addition,
courts have recently begun to apply a second standard developed specifically
to deal with the problem of recanted testimony. This test, commonly referred
to as the Larrison or "might" standard, has been adopted by a growing number
of state and federal courts.14
A. The Berry Standard
The probability standard was developed in the 19th century case of Berry v.
State.15 The Berry court determined that in order to obtain a new trial based
upon newly discovered evidence the defendant had to prove:
1 1For further analysis on this topic see Janice J. Repka, Note, Rethinking the Standards
for New Trial Motions Based Upon Recantations as Newly Discovered Evidence, 134 U. PA. L.
R. 1433 (1986); Sharon Cobb, Gary Dotson as Victim: The Legal Response to Recanting
Testimony, 35 EMORY L.J. 969 (1986); Note, Criminal Procedure: Minnesota Adopts the
Larrison Standard for Granting a New Trial Because of Newly Discovered Evidence: State v.
Caldwell, 67 MINN. L.R. 1314 (1983).
12 Although there are numerous types of newly discovered evidence upon which a
defendant could justify a motion for new trial, this note deals with only one, recantation
evidence.
The distinction between recantation and other types of newly discovered evidence
is important. With the latter, the defendant is attempting to introduce new material to
the record. With the former, the defendant is only attempting to receive a fair trial by
removing the perjury which taints his conviction. See State v. Britt, 360 S.E.2d 660 (N.C.
1987) (recognizing the distinction between the various types of newly discovered
evidence).
13 See Tim A. Thomas, Annotation, Standards for Granting or Denying New Trials in
State Criminal Cases on Basis of Recanted Testimony-Modem Cases, 77 A.L.R. 4TH 1031
(1990).
14 AII circuits except the ninth, second, and third have adopted the Larrison standard.
See United States v. Massac, 867 F.2d 174, 178 (3rd Cir. 1989) (recently applying the
standard because both parties agreed that it was appropriate; however, the court noted
that the circuit was not adopting the test); United States v. Krasny, 607 F.2d 840 (4th Cir.
1979); United States v. Stofsky, 527 F.2d 237 (2d Cir. 1975). Furthermore, the viability of
the standard has recently been questioned by several jurisdictions. See United States v.
Nixon, 881 F.2d 1305,1311-12 (5th Cir. 1989); United States v. Tiemey, 718 F. Supp. 748,
751-52 (W.D.Mo. 1989). See Thomas, supra note 13, at 1033-34.
1510 Ga. 511 (1851).
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1. That the evidence has come to the attention of the defendant since the
trial;16
2. That failure to discover the evidence prior to trial was not the result of
lack of due diligence; 17
3. That the evidence was so material that it would probably produce a
different verdict if the new trial were granted; 18
4. That the evidence was not merely cumulative; 19 and
5. That the effect of the evidence was not merely impeaching.
20
The Berry standard is used to deal with many types of newly discovered
evidence, not just recantation evidence.21
B. The Larrison Standard
Some courts have recognized that there are differences inherent in
recantation evidence which justify distinctive treatment.22 Realizing that the
high threshold requirements of Berry are inappropriate when conviction is
based upon perjured testimony, these courts have applied the purportedly
more lenient standard developed in Larrison v. United States.23 The
requirements for a defendant to obtain a new trial under the Larrison standard
are threefold:
1. That the court must be reasonably well satisfied that the testimony given
by a material witness was false;2
4
16 1d. at 527.
171d.
18Id.
19Id.
20Berry v. State, 10 Ga. 511, 527 (1851).
21See Holmes v. United States, 284 F.2d 716, 720 (4th Cir. 1960) (recognizing that
evidence which bears upon the integrity of the jury's verdict will warrant the granting
of a new trial regardless of whether it has a direct bearing on the guilt of the defendant);
Jackson v. United States, 371 F.2d 960,963 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (where the court determined
that testimony of an eyewitness discovered since the trial was sufficient to warrant the
granting of a new trial based upon newly discovered evidence); Casias v. United States,
337 F.2d 354,356 (10th Cir. 1964) (where the subsequent confession of another was held
sufficient to warrant the granting of a new trial based upon newly discovered evidence).
22See State v. Britt, 360 S.E.2d 660, 665 (N.C. 1987) (in the recantation context what is
being sought is a new trial absent untruthful testimony rather then one that merely adds
different material); State v. Caldwell, 322 N.W.2d 574, 585 (Minn. 1982) (noting that in
the ordinary case of newly discovered evidence a higher standard is justifiable, but when
a witness recants the situation is different); but see United States v. Stofsky, 527 F.2d 237,
246 (2d Cir. 1975) (criticizing the distinct treatment of recantation evidence).
23 Note, supra note 11, at 1317-18.
241d. at 1318.
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2. That without the possibly false testimony the jury might have reached a
different conclusion; 25 and
3. That the party seeking the new trial must have been taken by surprise
when the false testimony was given or been unaware of its falsity until after
trial.2 6
C. Comparative Analysis of the Standards
Although it may appear that the two standards lack congruence, in essence
they are similar in several respects. It is these similarities which have motivated
commentators to argue that the Larrison standard is ineffective as an alternative
to the lofty Berry requirements. 27
First, both standards require that the newly discovered evidence be material
to the final outcome. Under Berry, the materiality requirements are threefold.
First, the evidence must not be cumulative. 28 Second, the new evidence must
do more than merely impeach the credibility or character of the witness.29
Finally, the evidence must be so material that upon retrial a different result will
be probable.30
Larrison, on the other hand, requires only that a different verdict might occur
upon retrial. 31 Thus, in theory, the Larrison test requires a much lower level of
materiality. It has failed to adopt Berry's requirements that the evidence be more
than cumulative and do more than merely impeach the witnesses' credibility.32
Furthermore, when the words are given their ordinary meaning, might has a
much lower level of certainty than probable.
A second point of comparison is the knowledge that the judge must "impute"
to the jury as he makes his decision regarding the effect of the newly discovered
evidence.33 In determining, under Berry, whether a new verdict is probable, the
judge must make his determination in light of a hypothetical jury that would
have the benefit of having both the original testimony, as well as the subsequent
recantation, before it.34
Larrison, on the other hand, requires the judge to determine whether a
different verdict might result if the "recanted testimony was eliminated
25 Id.
26 Id.
2 7Cobb, supra note 11, at 976. But see Note, supra note 11, at 1319.
28 Berry v. State, 10 Ga. 511,527 (1851).
291d. at 527.
301d.
31Larrison v. United States, 24 F.2d 82,87 (7th Cir. 1928).
32Cobb, supra note 11, at 977.
33 Id.
34Md.; Note, supra note 11, at 1319.
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altogether from the jury's consideration. In other words, the hypothetical jury
to which the judge makes reference would have no knowledge whatsoever of
the testimony which was later recanted. "35 The difference in treatment would
appear to arise from the following language of Larrison: "[tihat without it [the
original testimony] the jury might have reached a different conclusion."36
Although the two standards differ in the amount of information they impute
to the jury, this difference sheds light upon a notable similarity. Both standards
require the trial judge to determine the credibility of the testimony.37 In Larrison,
the fact that the recanted testimony is kept from the jury necessarily implies
that the entire determination is left to the judge.38 Although Berry leaves this
determination to the jury, the judge is still required to make a preliminary
credibility determination.39 It is implicit in the judge's finding that if the
evidence will probably result in a different verdict, then the judge believes the
witness.40 Therefore, both standards require that the judge be satisfied that the
recantation testimony is true.
D. Judicial Skepticism and Recantation Evidence
What makes a moving defendant's cause even more difficult when
attempting to satisfy the Berry and Larrison standards is that the prevailing
judicial attitude when confronted with recanted testimony is to treat it with the
utmost suspicion and to grant new trials only under extraordinary
circumstances. 41 This attitude has become so universal42 that it appears to have
35Cobb, supra note 11, at 977; Note, supra note 11, at 1319.
36Cobb, supra note 11, at 977.
371d. at 977-78.
381d. at 978.
391d.
401d.
4 1See Bell v. State, 90 So. 2d 704, 705 (Fla. 1956); State v. Norman, 652 P.2d 683, 689
(Kan. 1982) (stating that recantation evidence is to be "looked upon with the utmost
suspicion." (quoting State v. Bryant, 607 P.2d 66 (Kan. 1980)); Thacker v.
Commonwealth, 453 S.W.2d 566, 568 (Ky. 1970) (recognizing that the general rule of
recantation evidence is to view it with suspicion and that the motion will be granted
only in extraordinary circumstances); Gehner v. McPherson, 430 S.W.2d 312,315 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1968) (recognizing the need for an end to litigation, and that new trials should
be granted as an exception and denied as the rule); State v. Perry, 758 P.2d 268, 273
(Mont. 1988).
42See Wadsworth v. State, 507 So. 2d 572 (Ala. Ct. App. 1987); Ahvakana v. State, 768
P.2d 631 (Alaska Ct. App. 1989); State v. Kasten, 823 P.2d 91 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1991); People
v. Harris, 272 Cal. Rptr. 590 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990); Jones v. State, 479 N.W.2d 265 (Iowa
1991); State v. Abell, 781 P.2d 750 (Kan. Ct. App. 1989); Carwile v. Commonwealth, 694
S.W.2d 469 (Ky. Ct. App. 1985); State v. Clayton, 427 So. 2d 827 (La. 1982); Carr v. State,
387 A.2d 302 (Md. Ct. App. 1978) rev'd, 397 A.2d 606 (Md. 1979); Potter v. State, 410
N.W.2d 364 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987); Smith v. State, 492 So. 2d 260 (Miss. 1986); State v.
Culkin, 791 S.W.2d 803 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990); State v. Miller, 833 P.2d 1040 (Mont. 1992);
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given rise to an inference43 that recantation evidence is not trustworthy and
should be treated as such absent the movant's ability to persuade otherwise.
Perhaps no statement reflects this distrust and suspicion more than the often
cited statement of Judge Seabury, in People v. Shilitano,
Bearing in mind that the witnesses to crimes of violence are often of a
low and degraded character and that after they have given their
testimony they are sometimes influenced by bribery and other
improper considerations, it is evident that the establishment of a rule
which left the power to grant a new trial to a defendant to depend upon
recantation by such witnesses would be subversive of the proper
administration of justice.44
The basic concerns surrounding recantation testimony, which have given
rise to this judicial inference, can be found within Judge Seabury's statement.
First, courts feel that recantation, by nature, calls into question the credibility
of the witness. During an initial trial the witness swore to an oath and testified
to one version of the facts. At a subsequent proceeding the witness, again being
sworn, told a different version of the same facts. Thus, the court is left with
determining when, if ever, the witness was telling the truth. Recantation
testimony, by nature, "demonstrates the unreliability of a witness."45 Thus, the
court's skeptical attitude must be employed because any contrary position
"would grant a person of questionable credibility and motive carte blanche to
overturn the determination of a jury operating within the bounds of our
constitutional protections .... 46
State v. Copeland, 448 N.W.2d 611 (N.D. 1989); Commonwealth v. McCloughan, 421
A.2d 361 (Pa. 1980); Marshall v. State, 305 N.W.2d 838 (S.D. 1981); Chambers v. State,
755 S.W.2d 907 (Tx. Ct. App. 1988) rev'd, 805 S.W.2d 459 (Tx. Crim. App. 1991); Brown
v. State, 816 P.2d 818 (Wyo. 1991).
4 3An inference is a permissive deduction while a presumption is a deduction
mandated by law. Engstrom v. Auburn Auto. Sales Corp., 77 P.2d 1059,1062 (Cal. 1938).
One commentator has argued that the courts effectively apply a presumption that the
recantation is untrustworthy. Repka, supra note 11, at 1441.
It is important to recognize that courts are not required to make inferences.
However, the inference against recantation evidence appears to have grown so strong
that some courts do feel constrained by it. In United States v. Troche, 213 F.2d 401,403(2d Cir. 1954) the trial judge noted that if "I could make the law I would have the case
retried, but... I am bound by this rule .... Also, some courts have required that the
witness be convicted of perjury before the recantation of trial testimony will be
considered.
44112 N.E. 733 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1916). Courts are concerned with the possibility that a
witness's motivation for changing his story is greed. See Dunbar v. State, 555 P.2d 548
(Alaska 1976).
45State v. Perry, 758 P.2d 268, 275 (Mont. 1988).
46 d. (citing People v. Shilitano, 112 N.E. 733 (N.Y. 1916)).
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Second, in light of the possible penalties for perjury, recantation raises
questions about a witness's motive for providing such evidence. 47 There is
always judicial suspicion that the witness' recantation is the result of duress,
coercion, or fear.48 Once a witness has left the confines of the court, he could
be subjected to "seductions, compulsions, or guile that an unscrupulous litigant
might choose to employ to rescue his ill-fated cause."49
Underlying these basic concerns are a series of policy considerations related
to the conceptual framework of our legal system. These policy considerations
arise from the concerns surrounding the "proper administration of [criminal]
justice."50 That first is the presumption of validity which attaches to a jury
verdict.51 Society has an interest in "resolving factual disputes in one
proceeding and according finality to those resolutions."52 Once a party has had
the opportunity to have his case presented for judicial decision, the judgment
of the court will be considered final. 53 The burden of proving that the judgment
was erroneous and thus worthy of a new trial properly rests with the
convicted.54
4 7See id. See also Cobb, supra note 11, at 983-87; Repka, supra note 11, at 1442-43.
48 E.g., State v. Caldwell, 322 N.W.2d 574,585 n.7 (Minn. 1982) ("Courts tend to view
recanted testimony with suspicion because of the possibility that it was obtained
through coercion."); see also Cobb, supra note 11, at 983.
4 9See Best v. State, 418 N.E.2d 316, 319 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981). Reoccurring
circumstances, such as those present in Potter v. State, underlie this concern. In Potter
the court denied a motion for new trial when evidence was introduced which tended
to show that the child victim was subjected to improper influences. First, evidence was
introduced which proved that the child's family was angry and blamed her for what
occurred.
Furthermore, upon discovering that her father would be incarcerated and after
having been counseled as to the economic effects of his removal from the household,
the child stated that she had not intended to hurt her father and only wanted to see him
receive treatment for his problem. As a result, the court believed that the child's
recantation was clouded by underlying factors which made the recantation highly
suspect. 410 N.W.2d 364 (1987).
SOSee People v. Shilitano, 112 N.E. 733, 735 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1916) (stating that "the
establishment of a rule which left the power to grant a new trial to a defendant to depend
upon recantation by such witnesses would be subversive of the proper administration
of justice."); Cobb, supra note 11, at 991-92.
51See Smith v. State, 492 So. 2d 260 (Miss. 1986); ROBERT M. CIPEs, MOORE's FEDERAL
PRACTICE 1 33.05 (2d ed. 1991) (recognizing that there is a presumption that the verdict
is correct and the burden is on the defendant to show that the motion should be granted).
52 Dobbert v. Wainwright, 468 U.S. 1231,1237 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Note,
supra note 11, at 1317; Repka, supra note 11, at 1443.
53 Statev. Perry, 758P.2d 268,273 (Mont. 1988). It is these same basic principles which
also underlie the notion of res judicata. Id.
54CIPES, supra note 51, at 1 33.05.
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Tied into the presumption of validity are notions of judicial economy.55 Due
process guarantees a defendant the right to have the courts adjudicate his
dispute. Judicial economy, however, mandates that there be an end to
successive litigation of the same issue.56 As a result, courts have been reluctant
to extend new trials to a moving defendant. "Our criminal judicial system,
which relies so heavily on witness testimony, could not function if final
judgments were constantly vacated on the basis of repudiation of testimony." 57
Courts may also consider the hardship that delay, followed by retrial, would
have on the prosecution. The more time that passes between the event and the
trial, the greater the opportunity the evidence may become stale, thus rendering
the judicial system uneconomical. 58
E. Conclusion
A comparison of the new trial standards, on their face, reveals that "the
greater 'leniency' of the Larrison test may be more illusory than real.' 59 Larrison
does require a much lower level of certainty that a different verdict would
result. However, this leniency is counterbalanced by the fact that the judge,
before a new trial may be granted, must be convinced that the testimony of the
55State v. Perry, 758 P.2d 268, 273 (Mont. 1988); Note, supra note 11, at 1317; Repka,
supra note 11, at 1443.
56 See State v. Perry, 758 P.2d 268, 273 (Mont. 1988) (recognizing that although due
process principles guarantee each individual access to the courts, these principles do
not give them a right to re-litigate the issue); Coleman v. State, 633 P.2d 624, 630 (Mont.
1981) (stating that "judicial economy dictates restrictions on reruns.").
57Cobb, supra note 11, at 991.
58 See United States v. Fountain, 840 F.2d 509 (7th Cir. 1988) (recognizing that delay
injures the prosecution's case because of the degradation of evidence over time), cert.
denied, 488 U.S. 982 (1988).
59 Cobb, supra note 11, at 978. It was the consideration of these factors that led one
commentator to conclude:
When the two tests are analyzed..., it becomes evident that the greater
"leniency" of the Larrison test may be more illusory than real. Larrison does
provide a less demanding standard than does Berry-"might" versus
"probable"-regarding the degree of certainty that a judge must have
in the likelihood of a different result on retrial. But this "easing" of the
standard is counterbalanced by Larrison's further requirement that the
judge first be convinced of the truthfulness of the recantation. Berry,
conversely, appears to require more certainty that a different result
would ensue, but does not require that the judge be as sure of the
truthfulness of the recantation. The tests seem equally exacting; the
difference is that Berry is more demanding regarding the probative
value of the recantation while Larrison emphasizes the credibility of
the witness. Hence, the two tests in actuality may present nearly equi-
valent hurdles to a defendant requesting a new trial.
9Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1993
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recanting witness is true.60 Although Berry focuses more on the probability of
a different result,61 the judge, as discussed previously, is implicitly required to
make an initial determination of credibility.
Thus, the judicial inference, employed by the courts when applying the new
trial standards, has made it nearly impossible for a moving defendant to obtain
a new trial. Just as both standards require the court to make an initial credibility
determination, they likewise require the trial judge to deny the motion unless
he is satisfied that the evidence is, to some degree, trustworthy. By viewing the
testimony as inferentially untrustworthy, however, a court will be unable to
grant a new trial except in those extreme circumstances when the defendant is
able to establish the truth of the recantation.62 It is this application which results
in the most notable similarity between the standards in the denial of a motion
for new trial when recanted testimony is presented as newly discovered
evidence. Courts have done little to make Larrison a meaningful exception to
the lofty Berry requirements. 63
II. THE CHILD AS WITNESS
The child sexual abuse litigation process is usually set in motion by an adult
who suspects that a child has been abused.64 This suspicion is frequently
triggered by an abrupt change in the child's behavior, a comment made by the
child, or some type of physical evidence. 65 After his or her own initial
investigation, the adult will usually notify the authorities.66 What follows is a
process of interrogation that has begun with the parents and will continue
through social workers, law enforcement personnel, attorneys, and judicial
officials.
What transpires in these interrogations is extremely important to
understanding the nature and reliability of a child's evidentiary statements.
When a child is interrogated, all the characteristics of the interviewer
67
601d.
611d.
62Courts, however, have failed to instruct on how a moving defendant may establish
the trustworthiness of the evidence. Repka, supra note 11, at 1443.
63 0ne commentator has noted that "[tjhe vast majority of courts that have considered
Larrison have done little to advance the test as a meaningful exception to the Berry
standard insofar as they have either denied the motion for retrial or indicated that the
result would have been the same under Berry." Note, supra note 11, at 1318-19 (citations
omitted).
6 4 See generally HOLLIDA WAKEFIELD & RALPH UNDERWAGER, ACCUSATIONS OF CHILD
SEXUAL ABUSE 23-24 (1988).
65 Id.
6 6 d.
6 7 Power, authority, and status. Id.
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influence the child's limited capacity and competency, and this produces the
end results.68 It is upon these results that the prosecution bases its case.69
Over the past decade the justice system has waged war against child sex
offenders.70 Many believe, however, that it is not the result of an epidemic of
sex abuse, but rather, the epidemic of "sex accuse."71 Coupled with the epidemic
of accusations is the aggressive manner with which alleged abuse cases are
pursued.72 Each year approximately 800,000 cases of child abuse are
investigated. 73 However, it has been estimated that 65% of all reports are not
grounded in fact.74 The problem, however, is that not all baseless claims are
weeded out before trial.
A. Psychology of the Child Witness
In order to fully understand the dangers surrounding child testimony it is
first necessary to understand generally how memory works. Memory is the
process of storing and recalling perceived information. The operation of
memory can be broken down into three general stages. The first stage,
acquisition, relates to the perception of an event that is encoded into memory.75
This process can be intentional, such as information learned for an examina-
681d.
691n sexual abuse litigation, the prosecution's entire case often rests upon the
information that can be elicited from the young victim. As a result courts are confronted
with two alternative hazards:
On the one hand, in accepting the testimony of the child there the danger
that [the child] may not be telling the truth, in which event an innocent
man may be convicted of crime and suffer the consequences thereof. On
the other, if the child's testimony is not accepted, a man guilty of crime
and possibly with the potential for more such, will go free.
State Store v. Smith, 401 P.2d 445,447 (Utah 1965) (alteration in original).
70The McMartin Preschool trial, the largest and most expensive criminal trial in
history, "shocked the nation into a heightened awareness of the specter of child
molestation." MichaelC. Tipping, McMartin Jury Deadlocked--Mistrial Declared, UPI,July
27, 1990, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Wires File.
71DAVID HECHLER, THE BATTLE AND THE BACKLASH: THE CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE WAR
(1988). "Sex accuse" is used as a term to describe what some commentators feel is an
epidemic in unfounded allegations of child sexual abuse. See id. at 3.
72 See CBS News-60 Minutes (CBS television broadcast, Mar. 15, 1992); Karl Easton,
M.D., Sexual Abuse: A Child's False Evidence, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 8,1984, § 4 at 20.
73 Teresa Simons, Children in Molestation Cases Subject to Adult Suggestions, UPI, July
25,1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Wires File.
74 Paul R. Lees-Haley, Innocent Lies, Tragic Consequences, TRIAL vol. 24, No. 4, Apr.
1988, at 37, 38.
75 Elizabeth F. Loftus & Graham M. Davies, Distortions in the Menory of Children, J.
Soc. IssuES, vol. 40, No. 2, 1984, at 51, 54.
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tion, or it can be unintentional.76 Certain experiences are remembered more
easily and much more clearly then others.77 This often results from the
complexity of the event being remembered, our psychological arousal or
alertness at the moment of perception, whether we are making a conscious
effort to remember, etc.78 A failure in acquisition will cause one to drop the
memory trace, resulting in permanent loss?' 9
The second stage involves what is commonly referred to as "short term" and
"long term" memory. Short term memory is a stage of conscious thinking, that
is, the subject will actually think about the event perceived. 80 At this point, the
memory will either be dropped or stored into long term memory.81 If storage
occurs, the memory trace, although it appears to be forgotten, actually lies
hidden, "waiting to be retrieved by an appropriate internal or external
stimulus .... "182
The final stage of memory is retrieval. Retrieval is the point at which an
individual actually calls back the information that has been previously
stored.83 In some instances, retrieval, or recall will be automatic or effortless. 84
This is especially true when the initial information is well learned. 85 "When we
are in a high state of excitement, information that is only moderately well
learned may not be retrieved at all ... Panic and stage fright can prevent
retrieval of information if it has not been highly overleamed."86 This is why
actors, musicians, and students, just to name a few, prepare to a state of
perfection.87
76 DouGLAs L. HEINTZMAN, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF LEARNING AND MEMORY 281
(Atkinson et al. eds. 1978).
77Id. at 282.
78See id.
79 Interview with Patricia Ambrose, Forensic Psychologist, Erie (Pa.) County Court
of Common Pleas, in Cleveland, Oh. (Feb. 1993).
80d.
81Id.
82 Id.
83 Loftus & Davies, supra note 75, at 54.
84 HEINZMAN, supra note 76, at 305.
85Id.
86Id.
87Id.
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Retrieval, however, is not always automatic. 88 At times an individual may
simply be unable to remember a perceived event. In such situations, retrieval
cues are crucial to remembering.89
The first two stages of memory are natural, while the third is learned. 90 Most
of these learned skills used to recall memories develop between the ages of five
and ten.91 A child who is unable to recall an event does not lack memory; he
simply has not learned how to recall memories at will.92 However, these
memories may be triggered back at any time by retrieval cues.93
1. Suggestibility of the Child Witness
Suggestibility may be the most widely expressed concern surrounding the
child witness. It has become a widely accepted proposition that children are
able to freely recall less of a perceived event then adults. 94 Upon free narration
a child may not be able to recall enough to provide adequate information of a
suspected event. As a result, the natural temptation is to use more specific
questions that contain retrieval cues which may contaminate the child's
report.95 Because of a child's impoverished retrieval skills, cues to aid retrieval
may be necessary and proper to help an interrogator elicit from the child an
accurate report of a real event. However, if the retrieval cue provides
misinformation, there is potential for contamination of the memory trace. Great
caution needs to be taken when a child has been integrated into the justice
system, for suggestion can be a potent disrupter of the truth.
88 d. at 306.
891d. at 308. Retrieval cues may take any form. For example, a glimpse of a familiar
place, a whiff of an aroma, a statement made in conversation, a leading question, etc.
See Anastasia Toufexis, When can Memories be Trusted?, TIME, Oct. 28, 1991, at 86.
90John R. Christiansen, The Testimony of Child Witnesses: Fact, Fantasy, and the
Influence of Pretrial Interviews, 62 WASH. L. REV. 705, 708 (1987).
911d. at 708.
92Id.
931d.
94Karen J. Saywitz, Children's Testimony: Age Related Patterns of Memory Errors, in
CHILDREN'S EYEWlTNEss MEMORY 36, 45 (Stephen J. CeCi et al. eds., 1987). This study
examined the quality of what the subjects recalled, specifically, whether young children
distort what they freely recall and whether they fill in gaps in memory by adding
irrelevant information. Seventy-two students ranging in age from eight to sixteen were
examined. The memory of the subjects for the description of the crime was tested and
compared in an attempt to assess age-related patterns of memory errors. The study
revealed that young children were able freely to recall less of a perceived event but were
able to use recognition cues to remember propositions not reported in free recall. See id.
95 WAKEFIELD & UNDERWAGER, supra note 64. One type of retrieval cue particularly
pertinent to the legal system is the leading question. A leading question is one which,
within the body of the question, suggests the answer desired by the examiner.
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Suggestibility has been defined as the extent to which a child can be made
to maintain that events occurred which actually did not or, that details of an
event which did occur were different than how actually reported.96 Children
are especially susceptible to confusion and distortion as a result of post-event
influences and suggestions.97
There are several explanations for a child's susceptibility to report
misinformation. The first is the examiner's own expectancy. It has come to be
accepted that an individual's expectation about the outcome of an event can
influence that outcome.98 If an interviewer is biased as to a particular outcome,
the interviewer's own expectations are often unwittingly reflected in his or her
subtle mannerisms.99 Because children are able to pick up on the slightest of
cues,100 the child will perceive the interviewer's expectation and report in
accordance with the suggestion in an attempt to be viewed favorably by the
interviewer.101
The second explanation for a child's susceptibility to report misinformation
is conformity. It has been found that a child's behavior may be changed as a
result of real or imagined pressures from another.102 The child's desire to be
accepted by, and receive approval from, the interrogator exerts a powerful
influence on the behavior of the child. 103
Finally, the subsequent reinforcement that is likely to follow a positive
response will increase the likelihood that the accepted behavior will continue
to occur.104 This process of interrogation may allow the child to "learn" the story
of abuse.105 These three factors, expectancy, conformity, and reinforcement,
96Loftus & Davies, supra note 75, at 53.
97 See Saywitz, supra note 94.
9 8 WAKEFIELD & UNDERWAGER, supra note 64, at 111. Not only has the behavior of the
target been modified by the interviewer's expectancy, but the target's interpretation of
that behavior may lead to a change in the self-concept and future behavior of the target.
Thus, the perceived expectancy has exerted an influence that extends far beyond the
original interaction and could significantly affect the life of the target person-perhaps
for the better, but as many who do this research fear, often for the worse. Id. at 112
(quoting J. Darley & R. Fazio, Expectancy Confirmation Process Arising in the Social
Interaction Sequence, 35 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 816,879 (1980)).
9 9 WAKEFIELD & UNDERWAGER, supra note 64, at 109.
10OMary Ann King &John C. Yullie, Suggestibility and the Child Witness, in CHILDREN'S
EYEWTNNSS MEMORY, (Stephen J. CeCi et al. eds., 1987).
101 Maria S. Zaragoza, Memory, Suggestibility, and Eyewitness Testimony in Children and
Adults, in CHILDREN's EYEWITNESS MEMORY 53 (Stephen J. CeCi et al. eds., 1987).
102WAKEFIELD & UNDERWAGER, supra note 64, at 114.
103Id.
104Id.
105Lawrence D. Spiegel, Child Abuse Hysteria and the Elementary School Counselor,
ELEMENTARY SCH. GUIDANCE & COUNSEuNG vol. 22, Apr. 1988, at 275,280.
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may result in the altering of a report or the reporting of an event that did not
occur.
One study, conducted by Paul R. Lees-Haley, a psychologist and vocational
expert, clearly demonstrates this potential.106 In a staged demonstration,
interviews were conducted with three children using commonly accepted
interview techniques. 107 The goal of the experiment was to demonstrate the
ease with which children could be manipulated, thereby revealing the potential
dangers their testimony poses for the justice system. 108 Each child was sworn
to an oath, provided with an anatomically incorrect doll, and questioned about
situations that might be investigated in real sexual abuse interrogations.109
The interviewer was able to elicit from two of the children that their fathers
had touched all three of their heads, all six of their hands, and all four of their
feet.110 The third child flatly denied that her father touched her anywhere,...
ever,.., in her entire life. 111 Furthermore, all three children agreed that Big Bird
had behaved in a lewd and lascivious manner by exposing to them his genitalia,
both on earth and on other planets in the solar system.112 Clearly, if this type
of ludicrous information can be elicited from children, the more "subtle" forms
of information that may prove particularly damaging to an accused may also
be elicited. For example, nowhere were the damaging effects of suggestion felt
more dramatically then in the McMartin Preschool trial. After a decade of
litigation the ultimate jury foreman stated: "If any one thing put a shadow of
doubt on the whole thing, it was the interviewing techniques of therapists who
questioned the children after the allegations surfaced." 113
Unfortunately, such activity is not peculiar to the McMartin case. In 1988, a
study examined 36 sexual abuse cases nationwide. It concluded that the large
majority of the stories were fabricated.11 4 In many cases, social workers and
106 Lees-Haley, supra note 74.
107Id. at 38. In the interviews, desired answers were rewarded with smiles and
encouraging remarks. Undesired answers were met with facial expressions of
skepticism and disappointment as well as voice tones to match. Also, the interviewer
would make remarks encouraging the child to respond in the desired manner.
Comments such as: "It is o.k. to tell me." and, "Are you sure?" Id.
1081d. at 39. In the experiment, no attempt was made to ask reasonable questions. The
point of the experiment was to demonstrate that often a child's answers do not reflect
experience but rather the child's perception of the interviewer's desires. Id.
10 91d. Each child was presented with a doll that had three heads, six arms, and four
legs. Id.
1101d.
111Lees-Haley, supra note 74, at 39.
112Id.
113 See Tipping, supra note 70.
114 Ellen Willis, Child Abuse: The Search for Scapegoats; Usually the Crime Occurs at Home;
So Why the Witch-hunt in Day-care Centers?, NEWSDAY, May 30, 1990, at 61.
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therapists, used by the prosecution, subjected children to a range of interview
techniques that spanned from leading questions to "coercive tactics that verged
on brainwashing."115 Interrogators often refused to accept a child's denial of
molestation and attempted to coerce the child into admission by telling him or
her that other children had already admitted being abused and by calling the
child stupid or cowardly if he or she would not.116
One major concern for the accused is whether the repeated questioning that
surrounds allegations of sexual abuse will ingrain in the child's memory the
report of an event that did not occur, or whether the child has simply learned
the story, thereby creating two separate and coexisting memory traces. If it has
ingrained into the child's memory, no subsequent statement of the truth could
ever correct the resulting injustice.
Until recently, it was widely accepted that changes in a child's testimony
resulted from "memory impairment."117 This theory argued that once
misleading information was suggested to the child, the child's memory of the
original event was erased.118 However, recent studies have tended to dispel
this notion of memory alteration. One such study, conducted by Gail Goodman,
a member of the Department of Psychology at the University of Denver, found
that although children were particularly vulnerable to suggestion, rarely did
the suggested information appear in their subsequent free recall. 119 Thus,
although they were vulnerable to the original suggestion, the misinformation
was not ingrained into memory.
More recent studies have offered other explanations for the likelihood that
the child's later reports will contain misinformation. Some argue the child's
memory for the truth is rendered inaccessible by suggested information. 120 The
115Id.
1161d. In another case, the defendant, a former day-care teacher, was convicted and
sentenced to 47 years in prison for 115 counts of sexual abuse. The defendant was
accused of, interalia, repeatedly raping children with kitchen utensils and making them
drink urine and eat feces. However, there was no physical evidence that any type of
abuse had occurred. Furthermore, as tape recordings of the interview with the children
reveal, the investigators pressured the children into making false allegations and
refused to take no for an answer. Id. at 62.
117Memory impairment theory suggests that a child's ability to remember is altered
as a result of the suggested information. See Zaragoza, supra note 101, at 55-56.
118Id. at 55. For example, if a subject who had witnessed an automobile accident had
it suggested to him that there was a yield sign present at the comer (when actually there
was a stop sign) and he reports the presence of that yield sign on a later memory test,
he does so because the yield sign has erased the stop sign information from his memory.
See Loftus & Davies, supra note 75.
119Gail S. Goodman et al., Child Sexual and Physical Abuse: Children's Testimony, in
CHILDREN'S EYEwITNEss MEMORY 1 (Stephen J. CeCi et al. eds., 1987).
120See Zaragoza, supra note 101, at 55. Children are sometimes unable to recall
information that they have perceived. As a result, without the help of a retrieval cue,
the stored information remains dormant. Once the proper retrieval cue is presented to
the child, the information will become accessible. Cf. Saywitz, supra note 94 (stating that
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original perception is still present in memory but the child is unable to retrieve
it. However, proper retrieval cues may bring the truth back to the surface at
any time. If the child received the proper stimulus, such as the smell of perfume
or the glimpse of a familiar place, the memory could be brought to the
surface.12 1
Other explanations focus on the dynamics of the interview process.
According to one theory, the child is, at all times, able to freely recall the truth.122
However, the "social pressures" imposed upon the child cause him to answer
in accordance with the suggestion.123 Furthermore, it has been suggested that
the child may simply have no memory of the suggested event and as a result
answers in a manner congruent with suggested information. 124 Such results
can be seen from the Lees-Haley study.125
The above are important considerations for the legal community. Child
witnesses can be led away from the truth, either intentionally or inadvertently,
through questions posed by careless interviewers. 126 If a child can be
influenced into making false allegations or misidentifications, then perhaps the
current treatment of recantation evidence needs to be re-evaluated. It may be
necessary to temper the standards to make the new trial a more accessible
remedy to a wrongly convicted defendant.
B. Conclusion
The potential suggestibility of the child witness reveals a potential for error,
an error which has life long consequences for everyone. For the accused, it may
mean incarceration and stigma. For the judicial system, it diminishes the
reliability of final judgements and society's confidence in those adjudications.
Discovering this error and dealing with it are necessary if our criminal justice
system is going to operate properly.
While it has been discovered that children are susceptible to suggestive
questioning, current research has also established that a child's memory for the
although children cannot freely recall all information stored in memory, they are able
to utilize retrieval cues to access the information).
121 See Toufexis, supra note 89, at 87.
122 Zaragoza, supra note 101, at 55.
123 See supra notes 98-105 and accompanying text; See Zaragoza, supra note 101, at 56.
For example, consider a witness who views a theft involving an individual holding a
hammer. The witness is later subjected to misinformation implying that the individual
was actually holding a screwdriver. The witness who remembers both the hammer and
the screwdriver will likely choose the screwdriver on examination. This is because the
witness will believe that the experimenter thinks the screwdriver is the critical item, and
in an attempt to be viewed favorably by the interviewer will select accordingly. Id. at
55-56.
124 See Zaragoza, supra note 101, at 56.
125 See supra notes 106-12 and accompanying text.
126Toufexis, supra note 89, at 89.
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original event is not necessarily overwritten by the erroneous information.
Rather than impairing memory, "misleading information will be incorporated
into testimony where ... the witness is capitulating to demand or other
pressures."127 This is important because in such situations the child does not
believe the misleading information. Rather, the original memory trace is still in
existence and therefore should be retrievable. 128 Thus, it may be that "the
situations in which the child witnesses are interviewed are particularly
suggestive, rather than that child witnesses are particularly suggestible. 129 As
a result, there is a likelihood that the original event will be retrieved or, upon
reflection, the confusion or distortion which resulted from improper
interrogation will be removed. Too often courts fail to recognize this "flip side
of the coin" as an explanation for recantation evidence. Such scientific
explanations are rarely, if ever, afforded proper consideration when weighing
the merits of a defendant's new trial motion.130
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE JUDICIAL INFERENCE
In light of current trends in research it is necessary to evaluate the grounds
on which the judicial disfavor of recanted testimony is based. If they are no
longer reliable, the inference fails in its basic purpose and thus should not be
used.131
As noted previously, the judicial disfavor of recanted testimony appears to
be based upon several broad considerations: first, judicial intuition;132 second,
the fact that recantations are often the result of duress or coercion;133 and third,
broad policies related to the conceptual framework of our legal system.134
A. The New Trial Standards and the Child Witness
If one is going to analyze the appropriateness of the current standards for
granting new trials when a child's recantation is presented as newly discovered
evidence, the historical development of the standards must be explored. Prior
to the adoption of the Berry rule in the mid-nineteenth century and even up to
the time the Larrison standard was developed nearly ninety years later, the
problem of child recantation had rarely been considered. Cases dealing with
127Brownlyn Naylor, Dealing With Child Sexual Assault: Recent Developments, 29
BRITISH J. CRIMINOLOGY, No. 4, Autumn 1989, at 396-97.
1281d.
129J. S. Baxter, The Suggestibility of Child Witnesses: A Review, 4 APPLIED COGNITIVE
PSYCHOLOGY 393, 404 (1990).
1301d.
131Repka, supra note 11, at 1442.
132 See infra part IV.B.
133 See infra part IV.C.
134 See infra part IV.D.
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motions for new trials were discovered as far back as the late eighteenth
century.135 However, none were discovered which dealt with motions for new
trial when a minor who had testified at trial subsequently recanted.
The Berry standard itself was not developed within the recantation context.
In Berry, the newly discovered evidence was testimony of an individual who
claimed to have been hired by the prosecution to befriend the defendant in
hopes that he could elicit from defendant evidence of guilt.136 In Berry the
recanting witness was willing to testify that he had not obtained any evidence
that would have tended to prove the defendant's guilt.137
Although Larrison was developed to deal with the problem of recantation
evidence, it seems clear that the court did not contemplate the problem of child
recantation. In Larrison, the court, in discussing the character of the witness,
noted that "stealing was [the recanting witness'] occupation, and jail his
abode."138 The court went on to state that "witnesses to crimes of violence are
often of a low and degraded character and that after they have given their
testimony they are sometimes influenced by bribery and other improper
considerations." 139
Based upon the above quoted language, it can be argued that the court
envisioned a much different context for the use of the proposed standard, as
evidenced by its continual references to the recanting witness' status as a
criminal. It would appear to be the character of the witness which rendered the
testimony untrustworthy and not a policy reason that would justify such
judicial skepticism.
Because the problem of child recantation was scarcely dealt with before the
standards for new trial were developed and because one may question the
intent of the current standards, one must in turn question their applicability to
the child recantation setting. Perhaps the standards for new trial within the
child recantation setting need to be rethought. If a conviction is allowed to
stand on perjured testimony the integrity of the criminal justice system will be
compromised.
B. Judicial Intuition
The notion of judicial intuition ties into the broad discretion that trial judges
are granted when reviewing motions for new trials.14 0 By nature recanted
135 See Case of Fries, 9 F. Cas. 826 (C.C.D.Pa. 1799) (No. 5,126) (recognizing that a
motion for new trial may be granted).
136 Berry v. State, 10 Ga. 511 (1851).
137Id.
138Larrison v. United States, 24 F.2d 82,83 (7th Cir. 1928).
13 9Id. at 88.
14 0 E.g., Dunbar v. State, 555 P.2d 548 (Alaska 1976) (recognizing that the grant of a
new trial rests within the broad discretion of the trial court).
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testimony should be treated with caution if the policies of our legal system are
to reflect common sense and common experience.
Current research in the area of child development shows that a child is
particularly prone to suggestion. 141 However, the memory of a child for the
original event is not necessarily overwritten by the misinformation. 142 This
principle is demonstrated in Dobbert v. Wainwright,143 where the witness gave
as his reason for intentionally perjuring himself at trial, inter alia, the influence
of and desire to please his social workers.144 He knew that he was testifying
falsely but lied anyway. It was not until years later that he recognized the
gravity of his act. He attempted to correct the wrong, but the court denied
defendant's motion.145
Furthermore, if the memory remains, it may be recalled at any time. Most
people, at some point, have confronted a situation which brought back a rush
of memories that had not previously been accessed or, that had cleared up a
confusing occurrence. For example, in Parker v. State,146 the recanting witness,
out one evening, saw an individual that resembled the wrongly convicted
defendant and suddenly realized that he was the culpable character.
147
Recently, there has been an influx of individuals coming foreword with newly
surfaced recollections of past events.148 What is happening is that during an
evocative or emotional moment, the formerly unaccessible memories are
coming to the surface. 149 The proper stimulus is all that is required for the
memories to come flooding back to consciousness.
Although it is necessary for a judge to be cautious and to be allowed
adequate discretion when ruling on new trial motions, the use of hunches is
14 1 See supra notes 106-16 and infra notes 152-60 and accompanying text.
142See supra part Hm.
143468 U.S. 1231 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting). In Dobbert the defendant's son
testified as to the abuse and murder.of his nine year old sister. The witness subsequently
recanted his testimony eightyears later. The lower courts denied the defendant's motion
for a new trial. Id.
144Witness Aff., Id.
1451d.
146437 N.W.2d 65 (Minn. 1989).
14 71d.
148 See Toufexis, supra note 89. Some of the more notable cases include a California
man who has been convicted of a murder he allegedly committed 23 years ago. The
prosecution's primary witness was the defendant's daughter who had allegedly
repressed the memory of her friend's murder. Similarly, Roseanne Arnold and former
Miss America Marilyn Van Derbur have come foreword with newly surfaced
recollections of past sexual abuse. Id.
As a response to these types of occurrences, at least twelve states have amended
their statute of limitations to allow the state to bring charges upon such delayed
discovery of sexual abuse. Id.
149 See Toufexis, supra note 89.
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not a sound practice. The need for caution should not require a position of
intuitive disfavor. Our legal system relies on demonstrably reliable proof, not
hunches. Therefore, the use of discretion should not be arbitrary so as to render
convictions unjust.150 If defendant has not had a fair trial on the merits, the
motion for new trial should be granted.1 51
C. Susceptibility to Improper Influences
Courts are cautious when weighing the validity of a defendant's motion for
new trial. They tend to suspect that the recantation resulted from duress or
coercion,152 and the judicial suspicion which surrounds recanted testimony is
often well grounded.153 Scientific evidence has shown that children are
susceptible to coercion from adults.154
But however appropriate this suspicion, it has a tendency to be carried too
far. It will often be overextended and result in denial of a motion when a new
trial ought to be granted. For example, in Commonwealth v. Krick,155 the
defendant, a boarder in the home of the alleged victim, was convicted of
statutory rape.156 Several weeks after trial the child recanted her testimony
stating that, at the urging of her father, she alleged the incidents in retaliation
for her mother leaving to be with the defendant. 15 7 Notwithstanding that the
recantation was more believable than the original testimony,1 58 the court
suspected the mother had coerced the daughter into recanting, although there
was no evidence of such before the court.159 A court's belief that recantations
150State v. Knapper, 555 So. 2d 1335 (La. 1990).
151People v. Minnick, 263 Cal. Rptr. 316, 317 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989) (quoting People v.
Love, 336 P.2d 169, 173 (Cal. 1959).
152 Coercion has been defined as a compulsion to do that which one's own freewill
would deny. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 135 (5th ed. 1983).
153 Potter v. State, 410 N.W.2d 364, 366 (1987).
154See supra part In.A.1.
155 67 A.2d 746 (Pa. 1949).
156Id.
157Id. at 748.
158At trial the witness testified that the defendant, on two occasions, had come into
her bedroom and forced her to have intercourse with him. On neither occasion did the
child make an outcry, although admittedly both times her mother would have heard
her shout. The defendant's testimony, denying the allegations, was corroborated by the
child's mother who testified that the defendant was with her at the time of the alleged
offenses. Upon recantation the child stated that she falsified the allegations at the urging
of her father and the family with whom the child was now staying in an attempt to get
revenge on her mother. Id. at 747-48.
15 9The court stated that it was informed by a reputable person that the child's mother
had threatened suicide if the child did not recant. However, no depositions were taken,
no affidavits received. Krick, 67 A.2d at 748.; See also Best v. State, 418 N.E.2d 316 (Ind.
Ct. App. 1981). Defendant was convicted of child molestation upon the sole testimony
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are often obtained through duress or coercion fails to recognize that equally
improper motives could be employed to obtain the original testimony.160
As noted previously, children are particularly susceptible to suggestion as
well as to the dynamics of the interview process.161 Because of this peculiar
susceptibility, it could be argued that leading questions and interview
dynamics are a peculiar type of coercion particularly relevant to child
testimony.162 The coercion results from the judicial process itself. Although it
is those who are involved in prosecuting the accused who improperly influence
the child, too often, courts fail to recognize this phenomenon as an explanation
for a child's recantation.163 If a child, through coercive questioning, can be
influenced into reporting an event which did not occur, the truth finding
process will be undermined. 164
D. Public Policy
As noted previously, the judicial disfavor of recantation evidence arises from
policy considerations related to the conceptual framework of our legal
of the child victim. The child subsequently recanted. The court refused to grant a new
trial stating "it is unknown what pressures may have been brought to bear to influence her
to recant her testimony." Id. at 320 (emphasis added).
160 See State v. Sanders, 460 A.2d 591 (Me. 1983) (recognizing that it was possible that
the child witness's mother had coerced him into making false allegations); State v.
Whiteside, 400 N.W.2d 140 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987) (child gave as reason for testifying
falsely that she feared theconsequences that may have resulted if she changed her story).
This problem is especially prevalent in divorce disputes that give rise to custody
battles. It is not uncommon to have one parent raise allegations of sexual abuse against
another in an attempt to gain custody of the child. See WAKEFIELD& UNDERWAGER, supra
note 64, at 294.
It is suggested that the child would go along with the allegation in an attempt to
ingratiate himself with the parent. The stress of the divorce may make the child more
vulnerable to influence from accusing parent. Furthermore, the behavior changes used
as evidence of abuse are often very similar to those which accompany the stress of
divorce. See Id.
161See supra part JI.A.1.
162 In determing whether a child has been subjected to improper influences the courts
should look to the age of the victim, circumstances under which the interrogation was
made, type of questions that were asked, form of questions, etc. See State v. Bethune,
578 A.2d 364 (NJ. 1990) (where court recognized that a child witness could be subjected
to coercive questions that may have an effect on the self-motivation of the report).
163 See State v. Murray, 559 A.2d 361 (Me. 1989). In Murray, the child's trial testimony
was halting and contradictory. She had a pattern of non-responses, continued to say she
was unable to remember, and refused to implicate the defendant as the perpetrator.
Although the trial court expressed concern about the witness's behavior, it failed to
sustain the defendant's objection to the repetitious questioning. Id.
164"[S]tatements . . . made directly in response to coercive questioning are
inadmissible . . . because coercive interrogation robs the statements of their
self-motivation .... There is a line ... between questioning that precedes a complaint
... and coercive questioning." Bethune, 578 A.2d at 366 (alteration in original)
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system.165 Courts are reluctant to overturn the work of a jury when it has
operated within its constitutional parameters. 166
Although this practice is logical, blind adherence to the policy is not. There
is no harder crime for an innocent defendant to disprove than sexual abuse.167
However, courts are not sympathetic to a defendant's plight. The presumption
placed upon the verdict is so strong that even when a defendant comes forward
with the most shocking evidence of perjury, a sworn affidavit from the chief
prosecution witness, the judge will dismiss the motion.168 In light of such
evidence, how can we be certain that there has been a reliable factual
determination of guilt sufficient to warrant public confidence in the outcome?
Courts need to be more attentive to the special issues surrounding child
witnesses. If they are not, innocent defendants may be punished for crimes they
did not commit. The need for finality and validity in judgments must be
balanced against the need to minimize injustice. 169
Consideration should be given to those difficulties which confront the
prosecution when recantation evidence is presented. Lengthy delays can
weaken the state's case. The memory of witnesses may fade, or upon the
passage of time the witnesses may no longer be accessible to the court, etc.
However, such considerations should be made in light of the realities of child
testimony. In sexual abuse litigation the primary evidence is obtained from the
victim. As noted from current research in the area of child development, the
subsequent recantation may be more accurate than the original testimony. The
time that passes between the child's integration into the justice system and his
subsequent recantation may provide him with the necessary time to shake the
influences of suggestion or sort through the confusion that may have arisen.170
The subsequent statements may be more reliable than the original trial
testimony.
Judicial economy is another issue courts consider when ruling on motions
for new trial.171 Court dockets are already overcrowded, and continual retrial
of the same issue would make the system exceedingly ineffective. However,
165 See supra notes 64-76 and accompanying text.
166 State v. Perry, 758 P.2d 268,275 (Mont. 1988).
167 This assumption is based on the fact that there are usually only two witnesses to
the alleged event. Furthermore, the heinousness of the act makes it extremely prejudicial
to a defendant. Allegations of sexual abuse tend to strike at the emotions of members of
mainstream society. Cf. HECHLER, supra note 71 (recognizing that the number of
accusations and prosecutions have vastly increased over the past decade).
168Dobbert v. Wainwright, 468 U.S. 1231, 1235 (1984) (recognizing that the strongest
evidence of perjury which a defendant can submit is a recantation affidavit).
169See Cole v. State, 589 S.W.2d 941, 942-43 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1979) (recognizing that
the need for finality in judgments be balanced against a concern for minimizing
injustice).
17 0Cobb, supra note 11, at 991.
17 1See supra notes 55-57 and accompanying text.
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this reason for denying a retrial may also be unsound in the child recantation
situation. First, the number of instances in which a child recants are low.
Furthermore, reforms necessary to protect a potentially innocent defendant
need not include a blanket provision requiring the granting of a new trial
whenever a witness recants. The proper remedy would provide the judge with
sufficient discretion to deny the motion for new trial if he were convinced that
it was not meritorious. New trials would only be warranted in certain narrowly
defined circumstances. 172 Therefore, the impact upon the system would be
slight at best.
It is necessary to recognize that there are serious considerations which would
preclude the granting of a new trial in every case in which a witness recants.
However, when these reasons are analyzed in light of the particularities of child
testimony, one should begin to question the soundness of the current new trial
standards as applied in the child recantation setting.
The motion for new trial should serve as one more procedural safeguard to
correct errors that were not detected prior to conviction.173 The current judicial
treatment of recantation evidence does not allow the new trial motion to serve
this purpose. Courts are denying motions in situations in which they are left
with no real indication of which version of the facts is correct. Allowing courts
to dismiss in all instances except those in which the defect is crystal clear
severely hampers the effectiveness of the remedy.
V. RETHINKING THE STANDARD FOR NEW TRIAL BASED UPON NEWLY
DISCOVERED EVIDENCE: AN ALTERNATIVE SOLUTION
Over the past decade much concern has been expressed over the reliability
of the child witness. Studies have been conducted which reveal deficiencies in
a child's memory and recall, 174 as well as a child's susceptibility to influences
which arise from the dynamics of the interview process. 175 As a result, some
commentators have called f or a re-examination of the competency require-
172 See infra part V.
173An accused is presumed innocent until proven guilty in a fair and reliable manner.
This is evidenced by other procedural safeguards which have been incorporated into
our legal system to protect an accused. For example, guilt must be proven beyond a
reasonable doubt. E.g., United States ex rel. Porter v. Kroger Grocery & Baking Co., 163
F.2d 168, 172 (7th Cir. 1947) (stating that a defendant in a criminal action is entitled to
the protection of having the government establish his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
Othersafeguards include the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy, seeU.S.
CONST. amend. V; and rules of evidence such as hearsay, see FED. R. EvID. 401-03, and
relevance, see FED. R. EvID. 801-05, which serve to guarantee thatguilt will be established
by the most reliable forms of evidence.
174 See supra notes 88-93 and accompanying text.
175 See generally supra part m.A.1.
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ments as a means of procedurally protecting a potentially innocent
defendant.176
Procedural safeguards are necessary to protect a wrongfully accused
defendant. However, use of these safeguards is neither a necessary nor proper
solution to the problems that surround the child witness. Often, the
prosecution's entire case will rest upon the ability of the child to testify.177 If
the child is held to lack the requisite competency requirements the case will not
proceed through the justice system.178
An effective remedy would strike a more even balance between the
competing interests of the parties. Society's interest in seeing those guilty of
crimes receiving punishment, in judicial economy,179 and in finality 18 0 would
not be disregarded by the use of a new standard. However, a convicted
defendant would also have a fairer opportunity to obtain a new trial in those
instances where perjury has cast doubt upon the validity of his conviction.
This objective could be attained by abandoning the judicial inference
currently employed by the courts. What should replace the current practice is
a rebuttable presumption of reliability.181 Once a defendant came forth with a
sworn affidavit 182 as evidence of perjury,183 the burden should be upon the
prosecution to show that the recantation is unreliable.
176 See Christiansen, supra note 90.
177 See Myers, supra note 5, at 189.
178 The crime would become virtually nonredressable. Thus, the injustice would be
taken from one extreme to another. Under the current system the injustice rests
primarily with the accused. First, the competency requirements are very low. See
generally FED. R. EvID. 601-03. Second, the burden of proof placed upon a moving
defendantby the new trial standards makes them virtually impossible to meet. See supra
part Im.A-B. Raising the competency requirements unjustifiably shifts the burden of
proof to the prosecution. The end result is to effectively insulate the defendant from
prosecution.
179 See supra notes 55-57 and accompanying text.
180 See supra notes 52-54 and accompanying text.
181This rebuttable presumption would operate in conjunction with either the Berry or
Larrison standard. There is no reason to abandon the framework already established.
The court should make an original credibility determination based upon the proposed
standard. See infra notes 209-16 and accompanying text. Once this is accomplished, the
court should apply the new trial standard that the jurisdiction has adopted.
182 According to the proposed solution a defendant must present an affidavit to the
court before the motion will be considered. Under the current standard there is no formal
requirement that the recantation be presented in the form of an affidavit, although
nearly all courts require it. See State v. Credeur, 328 So. 2d 59 (La. 1976) (adopting the
Berry standard but not requiring that the defendant produce an affidavit).
183A sworn affidavit of thewitness is the most direct evidence of perjury that a moving
defendant could produce. See Dobbert v. Wainwright, 468 U.S. 1231, 1235 (1984).
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This burden would be met when the prosecution introduced evidence
sufficient to support afindingl84 that the recantation was obtained through duress
or coercion. Such a requirement would prevent courts from denying motions
where the evidence was insufficient to establish that coercive techniques were
employed.185 A formal hearing should be used for purposes of presenting this
evidence as well as for testing the validity of the presumption. At this stage,
the court would hear the prosecution's evidence and then would interview the
child,186 thereby giving the judge an opportunity to observe the child's
demeanor as well as question the child in an attempt to obtain further evidence
of motive.187
When conducted properly, this hearing could be a significant evidentiary
tool which would aid the prosecution in overcoming its presumption. In Potter
v. State,188 the court made excellent use of this proceeding to find evidence
sufficient to cast doubt upon the genuineness and reliability of the recantation.
First, the court allowed the child to testify to her new version of the facts. 189
Then, the court proceeded to question her as to her motive for recanting. 190 The
child stated that she made up the story because she was mad at her father and
wanted him removed from the household. 191 The court concluded that her
reasons for recanting were not supported by the other evidence.192 Further-
184This is the same burden as is required by Federal Rule of Evidence 104(b). See FED.
R. EvID. 104(b) and official comment.
185 See Commonwealth v. Krick, 67 A.2d 746 (Pa. 1949) (where the court denied the
motion although no evidence of coercion was before the court); Best v. State, 418 N.E.2d
316 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981) (where the court denied the motion stating that "it is unknown
what pressures may have been brought to bear to influence her." (emphasis added)).
186 Under the proposed standard the court would have to hold a recantation hearing
to allow the judge to observe the demeanor of the child witness in order to determine
credibility and to allow the judge to question the child. These questions would help elicit
information that may have a bearing on whether the child were subjected to improper
influences.
Under the current standards a motion for a new trial may be decided upon the
submitted affidavits alone, without holding a formal hearing. See CIPES, supra note 51,
at 33,02(2); United States v. Kienzle, 896 F.2d 326,330 (8th Cir. 1990); United States v.
DiPaulo, 835 F.2d 46, 51 (2d Cir. 1987). However, some jurisdictions do require that a
formal hearing be conducted. United States v. Page, 828 F.2d 1476,1478 (10th Cir. 1987),
cert. denied, 484 U.S. 989 (1987); Dunbar v. State, 522 P.2d 158, 160 (Alaska 1974).
18 71n order to effectively rebut the presumption the prosecution must present
evidence sufficient to support a finding that improper influences existed.
188410 N.W.2d 364 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987).
18 91d. at 367.
190Id.
1911d.
1921d. at 368-69.
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more, the recantation, as presented, appeared to be memorized and
rehearsed. 193
Next, the prosecution introduced evidence to further convince the court that
the recantation was not truthful. First, the prosection introduced evidence of a
conversation that the child had with her social worker in which the child stated
that she did not wish to see her father punished. 194 She only wanted to see him
receive help for his problem.195 The prosecution then went on to introduce
evidence of a psychological report, the results of which tended to show the
child had been abused.196 Finally, the prosecution submitted evidence
concerning statements made by the witness' older sister. After the verdict was
handed down, the sister rushed down the corridor of the court house
exclaiming that she was going to kill the witness when she found her.197
Viewing the totality of the evidence, the Potter court concluded that the
circumstances which surrounded the recantation cast serious doubt upon the
veracity of the statements.198 As a result, the court denied the motion.199
Similarly, in State v. Harold,2W the court concluded, after holding its
evidentiary hearing, that the recantation lacked credibility. In Harold, the child
witness had testified against her uncle, who was accused of raping another
child. At the hearing, the prosecution presented evidence which tended to
prove that subsequent to the child's testimony her family members treated her
with animosity.201 Furthermore, evidence of a conversation was presented
during which the child witness said that the victim was not raped, but rather,
"gave it up."202 The child said that she knew this because her aunt had told her
so.203 Upon completion of the prosecution's evidence the court evaluated the
child. During this evaluation the court elicited from the child that she was
punished for testifying and that once she told her mother she had lied about
the incident she was excused. 204 The court then went on to question the child
as to her motive for testifying untruthfully. The child stated that she lied at trial
193Potter, 410 N.W.2d at 368-69.
194 d.
195 d.
1961d. at 366-68.
1971d. at 366.
198Potter, 410 N.W.2d at 368.
199 d. at 369.
200444 A.2d 605, 606-07 (N.J. Super. 1982).
2 01Id.
2 021d. at 607.
2 031d.
2 041d. at 606-07.
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because the victim promised to give her a dollar if she did so.205 However, when
asked when she was to receive this money she seemed confused and offered
conflicting stories.206 As a result, the court felt that the recantation lacked
truthfulness and denied the motion.207 In both instances the court made superb
use of its voir dire. In fact, in Potter, the appellate court commended the trial
court for its thorough findings of fact.208
If the prosecution has effectively carried its burden under the proposed
standard, the court would not automatically deny the motion. The defendant
would then, and only then, be forced to come foreword with further evidence
of truth or face having his motion denied.209
Appealability of the order would further serve to protect the defendant's
interest. Upon review, great deference would be given to the determination of
the trial judge.210 The lower court's decision would only be reversed if there is
a clear showing of abuse.211 Appellate courts would recognize that the trial
judge had the opportunity to witness the child both at trial and at the hearing
(if one was held) and therefore was in the best position to determine whether
a new trial was warranted. 212
Furthermore, since the granting of the motion appears to be the exception
and not the rule, the use of judicial discretion leans toward denying the motion.
Thus, very few cases are overturned on appeal. However, with employment of
the rebuttable presumption, the balance would be struck with more weight on
the side of granting the motion. Thus, the use of discretion should shift as well,
toward the granting of the motion. Therefore, it would be likely that a court
would abuse its discretion in not granting defendant's motion. Accordingly,
more orders denying new trial motions should be reversed and the defendant
will have another level of protection.
20 5Harold, 444 A.2d at 606-07.
206Id.
2 071d. at 607.
2 08potter v. State, 410 N.W.2d 364 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987).
20 9Under the current standard, courts often feel that more evidence is required before
a motion will be granted. See Dobbert v. Wainwright, 468 U.S. 1231,1235 (1984) (where
the Court determined that not withstanding the recantation "'there [was no] evidence
or proof to support [the] allegation of perjury."') (alteration in original)
It is inherently unfair to make a moving defendant present further evidence at
the outset of the motion. Generally, there is no other evidence to present. However, once
the prosecution has presented evidence sufficient to overcome the presumption, then
such a requirement is warranted. The recantation would be so questionable that
defendant should be required to further convince the court of its veracity.
21OBrown v. State, 816 P.2d 818, 821 (Wyo. 1991).
2 11Id.
2 12See, e.g., id. (recognizing that the trial judge is in the best position to make the
determination).
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There are several factors which make this proposal a feasible alternative to
existing standards. First, in those cases in which the court was left with no real
clue as to which version of the child's testimony is true, a new trial would be
granted.213 The prosecution would not have met its burden and thus would
have failed to overcome the presumption. Accordingly, the defendant's right
to receive a fair proceeding would be protected.
Second, the interests of justice would be well served by the proposed
standard. Society's interest in seeing the guilty being punished would not be
undermined.214 The defendant would not be absolved of his past sin. Rather,
he would simply receive a new trial free from any impropriety. Whether the
defendant should be released would be for a new jury to decide.
Furthermore, the impact on judicial resources would be minimal. The
proposed standard would not require the granting of a new trial in every case.
In many instances it would be clear that the recantation was obtained through
the use of coercion. The combination of the prosecution's evidence along with
the judge's questioning of the child would produce sufficient grounds for the
court to be satisfied that the recantation had been obtained improperly. As a
result, the number of instances in which a new trial would actually be granted
should not be sufficient to undermine this societal concern for judicial
resources.
Society's interest in finality ofjudgements, 215 however, would be the concern
most impacted. This logically follows from the use of the rebuttable
presumption. If this standard were utilized properly, a new trial would be
granted in two instances: first, when it was clear that the trial testimony was
false; and second, when the judge was uncertain which version of the facts was
true. Consequently, more motions would be granted.
Our criminal justice system is replete with procedural safeguards designed
to protect an accused.216 Clearly if we are to err, our system, as designed,
dictates that we err on the side of the defendant. Accordingly, a consideration
such as finality must be secondary to a just result.
This proposed standard would adequately serve the interests of both the
defendant and society without radically changing recantation law.217 The new
213 But see United States v. Troche, 213 F.2d 401 (2d Cir. 1954) (where the court denied
motion in a similar instance).
214 See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
2 15See supra notes 52-54 and accompanying text.
2 16 See supra note 173.
2 17Under the current standard the judge is to weigh the credibility of the evidence.
This is a determination traditionally left to the jury. See Solis v. State, 262 So. 2d 9, 10-11
(Fla. Ct. App. 1972) (recognizing that it is not the job of the trial judge to determine
whether the witness was telling the truth because in so doing the judge would be
preempting the function of the jury), cert. denied, 265 So. 2d 372 (Fla. 1972). Thus, the
current treatment of recantation usurps the power of the jury.
Furthermore, such an approach should be satisfactory to those commentators who
are calling for a rethinking of the competency standards. See Christiansen, supra note
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trial remedy would serve as a procedural safeguard to help reduce the number
of innocent defendants who wrongly serve time in prison. Also, one must keep
in mind that what the defendant would be granted is a new trial, not an
automatic release. If the accused were innocent, the court, by using its power
to grant new trials, would be able to correct an egregious error. If the accused
were guilty, "truth [would] ultimately prevail, and [an] individual guilty of a
crime [would] ... answer for the same."218
VI. CONCLUSION
After analyzing the current standards for, and reasons supporting the
motion for new trial, one should begin to feel uncomfortable with our current
treatment of child recantation evidence. Relying on a child's evidentiary
statements as being absolutely reliable is contrary to both common experience
and current research. When courts do so, the adequacy of the factual
determination of guilt may be questioned.
'The examination of child witnesses in cases of sexual molestation involves
complexities at psychological and legal levels and requires rigorous analysis
and assessment to safeguard the rights and interests of the alleged victim and
of the [defendant]."219 In failing to recognize this, courts are ignoring the
potential for serious injustice. It is this injustice which destroys the foundation
upon which our justice system is built. Courts need to reevaluate the new trial
standards in light of the special issues which confront them when a child is
presented as a witness. The remedy of "new trial" must serve as an adequate
procedural safeguard for a wrongly convicted defendant.
CHRISTOPHER J. SINNOTr
89. Because the courts will be directed to grant a new trial in those situations where a
suspected perjury casts a shadow upon the validity of the defendant's conviction, the
need to raise competency requirements is tempered. Theoretically, the grant of a new
trial should cover those instances where the competency of the child could have come
to question.
2 18People v. Shilitano, 112 N.E. 733, 744 (N.Y. 1916) (Hogan, J., dissenting).
219Herbert N. Weissman, Forensic Psychological Examination of the Child Witness in Cases
of Alleged Sexual Abuse, AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY vol. 61, No. 1, Jan. 1991, at 48.
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